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In \h6 suor6m6 Gourt o1 th6
Sta'6 oi utan
OCTOBER TERM, 1929

PATRICK SlJLLI\rAN, AND
ELI.Z..-\.BETH SULLIVAN, His WIFB,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
JOHX G. COXDA_S,
Defendant and Respondent._

APPELL.!L\'"TS' BRIEF.
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages from the defendant for the alleged unlawful
trespass of defendant's livestock upon plaintiffs'
real property, and for an injunction restraining defendant from further trespassing upon plaintiffs'
lood.
Defendant filed an amended answer in the way
of a general denial, and by way of affirmative defense. commencing with paragraph 14 of _defenant'~
an~wer, (Abst. 17), defendant alleges as follows:
"14. For a further answer and defense to said
Fifth Cause of action, defendant alleges that he
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is the owner, entitled to, possession and in poss,ess;ion of certain lands in White Pine Canyon,
Summit C'ounty, Stat~ of Utah, and that
various ot!1er persons are the owners of other
tracts of land in said canyon, both above, be1o·w,
and adjoining the said lands o'vned by this defendant. That there is no\v · and has been for
more tha.n sixty ye~ars past, a well traveled road
up said White Pine Canyon, branching from the
main State Highway and running through and
beyond the said la1nds of the defendant and
through the lands owned in said canyon by said
other persons. That said road is a publlic hi,qh~uay and has been used continuously by the defe1idant and by his predecessors in interest and
by the aforesaid Otljners of land in said White
P~ine Canyon a,nd vicinity and by the public generally, and especially by the residents of Park
r:ity and of Surn1ni.t County, State of Utah, for
1nore than s1~xty yenrs past. That the defend-

ant does claim the rig-ht to use said road for
ingress to and egress from his said land in
White Pine Ca1nyon. That said road runs
through a portion of the tract of land described
in the first paragraph of the plaintiffs' complaint herein, and is the same road as the1 road
referred to in the Fifth Cause of Action of said
complaint.
'-~

15. Further answering, the defendant alleges that the said road referred to in paragraph
14 of this kA.;mended Answer, was at the time
of the commencement of this action a pub1ic
highway ·by prescription and by having been
ns:ed continuously, op~enly, notoriously and under .a claim of right by the publuc generally and
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by the d~ft1.ndant and by his predect~::)~or~ in int~r~st

for n1ore than t\\~(\nty years.
16. Furth~r answPring·. the defendn111t alleg-t"\s that he ha=-' inYe~ted more than RixtY-FiYl~
.
Hundred ($6500.00) Dollars in purchasinglands and improvement~. including a d\velling
house.. and in making improvements on said
land so purchased by him in ~aid \V'hit~ 1-"'ine
Can~·on.
That sRid lands comprise Thirteen
Hundrffi Sixty-Six (1366) acres, a.nd that the
sole and only m~ans of ingress to and egress
from said lands Rnd improvem'ents and saicl
dwelling hons~. owing to the topography of the
country. is over the ~aid road described in pa.rllgraph 14 of this ~-\meonded Answer, and that
said road is absolute!, necessary to the proper
enjoyment by the defendant of his lands. improvements and dwelling house in said White
Pine Canyon, and said defendant will suffer irreparable dama~e if he is deprived of the free
use of said road for all purposes.
17. Further answerin!S, the defendant a~I
leges that the said plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest in the lands described in the
first paragraph of plaintiffs' complaint herein,
which lands plaintiffs claim they own, but which
claim of ownership defendant denies. with full
knowledge thereof permitted and acquiesced in
the free use of said road described in paragraph
14 of this Amended Answer by the public generally and by the defendant and his predece~
sors in interest in driving livestock over said
road and in using said road for all kinds of
vehicular traffic, and that said plaintiffs and
their predecessors in interest with full knowledg-p thereof permitted and acquiesced in the
free use of said roa.d by the defendant and his
......

~
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predesessors in intere~st in hauling building material and supplie-s over said road to be used
in thG construction of defendant's said d"\\r.elling
house, barns, blacksmith shop,· and other outbuildings, fences, and etc., well knowing that
defendant rund his predecessors in interest had
no other means of access to his said lands, improvements, and dwelling house, and by reason
thereof the defe~ndant alleges that the plaintiffs
are estopped from now claiming that the said
road is not a publtic road and are also estopped
from now claiming that defendant has not the
right to use said road for all purposes as a
n1eans of ingress to and egre:ss -from his said
lands, improvements, and dw-elling house."
(Italics ours).
Defendant, continuing said ans,ver and by ·way
of counterclaim ( Ahst. 20), aJleges as follows:
'' By way of countetrclaim against the said
plaintiffs, the defendant allege's:
1. That defendant is now and for several
years last past has been the owner, in possession and entitled to the possession of thH follo,ving d<~scribed lands in Summit County,
state of Utah:

All of Lots 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16~
Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East,
S. L. M., c.omprising 629 acres.
Also 120 acres in Section 12, Township 2
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian:
Also 120 acres in Section 12, Township 2
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian:
Also Lots 6 and 9 in Section 6, Township
2 South, Range 4 East, and 520 .acres in Section
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7, 'rownship :! South, Rangt.l 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, compri~ing altogether 1366 acres.
2. That said Lots 9 and 10 in Section 1,
To"11ship ~ South, Range 3 En.st, inunediatelly
adjoin lots 7 and S of ~aid Section 1, ". hich are
the lands describeti in the first paragraph of
11laintiffs' complaint herein.
3. That all of the afcJr~said lands are situated in W"hat i:' kno"·n as •'Vhite Pine Canyon'
t"-o or three miles uorthwesterlv from Park
City, in Summit County, State of Utah.
•

<J

4. That various other persons, in addition
to defeondant. own other tracts of land in said
White Pine Canyon both above, belo'v and adj-)~nllJ? the ~aid Ianrl ownt--d by the defendant.
That th~ major portion of said land is suitable
solely for grazing Ji,·estock thereon, and a small
portion thereof i~ susceptible of cultivation and
suitable for the raising of hay.
5. The defendaBt alleges that he is the
owner, entitled to the possession amd in possession of certain lands in White Pine Canyon,
Summit County, State of Utah, and that various other persons are the owners of other tracts
of land in said canyon, both a.bove. below, .and
adjoining the said lands owned by the defendant. That there is now and has been for more
than .~ixty years past a well traveled road up
said White Pine Canyon. branching from the
main State Higohway and runnin_go through and
bevond the said lands of the defendant and
th~ough the land~ owned in said canyon by said
other persons. That Raid road is a public highu·ny n.nd b:ts been used continuously by the defenrlant and by his predecessors in interest and
hy thP aforesaid ownerB of land in sa.id White

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
Pine Canyon and vicinity and by the public
generally, and especially by the residents of
Park City and of Summit County, State of
lJtah, for more than S'ixty years past.. That the
defendant does claim the right to use said road
for ingress to and egress from his said land in
vVhite PJne Canyon.
That said road runs
through a portion of the- tract of land described
in the first paragraph of the plaintiffs' complaint herein, to-wit:
Lot 8, S·e.ction 1, Township 2 South, Range
.J_ East, Salt Lake Meridian.
6. The defendant a.ll~ge~ that the /.said
road re,ferred to in paragraph 5 of this counterclaim was at the time of the commencement of
this action a public highUJ-ay by prescription and
by having been used continuously~ openly, notoriously, and under claim of right, by tl1e plib.lic generally and by the defendant and by his
predecessors in interest for more than twe.nty
yea.rs..

7. The defendant alleges that he has invest·ed more than Sixty-Five Hundred ($6500.00) Dollars in purchasing lands and improvements, including a dwelling house, and in making improvements on sa,id land so purchased by
hiln in said \Vhit •. ' Pine Canyon. That said
lands comp1risa Thirteetn-Rundred Sixt~-Six
(1366) acres and that the sole and o11ly mennR.
of ingress to and egress from said lands and
improvements and sa!id dwelling house, owing
to the topo.nraph.~t of the country, is over the
said road described in paragraph 5. of this
counterclajm, and tha1t said road is absolutPly
necessary to thP proper enjoyme·nt by the defendant of his lands, improv0m0nts nnd dw·ellI
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ing hou::;e in said \Vhite Pine Canyon, tUld su~iJ
deiend.ant \vill ~ufft.\r irn.\parnble drunage if he
i~ depriYed ot' the fret~ ust\ of said road for all
purpt)'Sl~~.

~- The d~fendant alleges that the said
plaintiff~ and tht~ir predece-ssors in intt~rPst in
the land-s Lle-scrib~l in the first paragraph of

plaiutitl'-s · C{)mplaint her~in, \Yhich lands plaintiff~ claim to o'rn, but. which claim of ownership
defendant denies. with full knowledge thereof
permitted a.nd acqui(·~eed in the fretL uSJe of said
r,)ad described in paragraph 5 of this counterclaim by the public generally and by the defendant and his predecessors in interest in
driving liYestock or~r said road and in using
s~:.id road for all kinds of z·ehicular traffic, and
that said plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest with full knowlroge thereof permitted
and acquiesced in the free use of said road by
the defendant and his predecessors in interest
in hauling building material and supplies over
said road to be used in construction of de~
fendant 's said dwelling house, barns, blacksmith shop, and other out-buildings, fences, and
etc., well knowing that the defendant al!ld his
predecessors in interest had no other means of
access to his lands. improvements, and dwelling
house, and by reason thereof the defendant allegPs that the plaintiffs are estopped from now
claiming that the said road is not a public road
and are also estopped from now claiming that
defendant has not the right to use said road
for all purp.oses as a means of ingress to and
e~ress from hi~ said lands, improvements, and
dwelling house.
.
9. Tbt~t in the month of February. 192R,
tl1e rlPfendant had stored on his saicl lands in
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White Pine Canyon, about ten tons of hay,
which he sold to a neighbor. That when the
purchaser of said hay tried to travel over said
road hereinbefore described, where the same
runs through a portion of said Lot 8 in Section
1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M.,
for the purpose of taking said hay from the
premises owned by the defendant, the said
p:la.intiffs, their s,e,rvants, agents and employees,
by threat of violence and force and erecting
fences and a gate across said road and by locking said gate, forcibly prevented the purchaser
of sa~id hay from using said road for access to
said lands and pre,mises owned by the defendant
and hereinbefore described, and th~reby forcibly prevent~ed hin1 from hauling said hay from
the premises of the defendant.
10. rrhat the plaintiffs have forbidden the
defendant to in any manner use said road where
the same paisses through said I..Jot 8, Section 1,
To,vnship 2 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M., and
have threatened the defe~ndant with violence if
he attempted so to do.
11. That defendant greatly fears and is
jus.tly and reasonably apprehensive that the
plaintiffs \vill in the future continue to interfe~e with the free: use of said road by the defendant and by persons with whon1 he has business, and by the public generally for vehicular
traffic, and for the driving of livestock thereon
and will thereby do .and continue to do irreparable damage to the defendant and his lands and
improvements, aforesaid, unless the plaintiffs
be by this Honorable Court enjoined from so
doing.
12.

Tha.t defendant iR without any plain,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sp~L\dy

or adt.\quate l't?'lllt.\dy at hnv in

tht~

prem-

l~es.

\\.liLl{~~}\)1\~,

dt.\feudant prays as f()llows:

1. That the plain tirrs take nothing by their

eLnuplnint herein and that the sante be by this
Honor(\ble ('!ourt dislllissed.
~-

That thL~ said plaintiffs, their servants,
agents and empluyees be by this Court permanently enjoined from obstructing or in any other
manner interfering with_ the free use by the defendant. his ser\ants. agents and employees and
by the public generally. oi the road running
through Lot ~' Section 1, To,vnship 2 South,
Range 3 East, S. L. lL, in Summit County,
State of Utah, and leading into the premises of
t.C.e defendant in said Section 1. for the purpose
,,.f \ehicnlar traffic and driving livestock over
said road. That in the meantime and until
a futher order of this Court, the said plaintiffs
their servants. agents, and employees be restrained from doing any of the said acts.
3. That said road hereinbefore described
b~ declared by this Court to be a pubic highway, and that the right of the defendant to the
use of said highway for all purposes, including
the driving of livestock over the same be quieted and confirmed.

4. For such other and further reli·ef a c;;
may be just and meet in the premis~es~ and for
defendant's eost of suit." (Italics ours).
Plaintiffs filed their duly verified reply to the
above affirmative allegations of defendant's answer
and to defendant's counterclaim wherein they deny
genemlly the allegations therein contained, and deny
generally that any ''public highway'' ever existed
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over the phtintiffs' land (defendants to the counterclaim).
At the beginning of the trial, plaintiffs expressly
dismissed without prejudice their law action wherein they sought to recover damages, and offered proof
in support of their equitable suit for injunctive relief, by introducing their abstract of title showing
clear and unincumbered title, and failing to
show any fight of way, easement or public hig-hway.
'J~he allegations in respondent's ans\ver B!ld
counterclaim upon 'vhich he appar011tly relies for_a.n
affirmance of the judgment below~ is found in paragraph 14 of his answer, as follo,vs:
'' That there is no\v and has he-en for
more than sixty years past 3J well traveled
road up said! White Pine Canyon * * That
said road is a public high,vay and has been
used continuously by the defendant and by
his predecessors in interest and by the- aforesaid owners of land.in said Whit~ Pine Ca.nyon and vicinity and by the public generally,
and espe·cially by the residents~ of Park City
and Summit County, State of Utah, for more
tha~n sixty ye,ars p-ast.''
In paragraph 5 of respondent's counterclaim
he a1leges:
'' That salid road is a public hi_g-h,vay. ''
·)!<

He further alleges that the same has b'een usN!
for more than "'sixty ye~ars past" a.nclthat :said'road
runR thru a -·-portion of Lot 8, a tract o'f hind belong-

ing to plaintiffs.
In parHQ"ranh 6 of defendant's counterclaim he
allf'l¢es ( rPfClr1~in.g to the roarl de1scribed in pn,ragraph -5) +l1at it 'vaR "at thP timP of tl1~ comnl~ence
ment of this action a public ~i.ghwAy by prescrip-
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tion and by baYing bet.~l ust~d el}ntinuously, opP.nly,
notoriously, a.nd under a. clnim of rig·ht by- tht\ public
generfilly ~md by the defendant and his predcces~ors in int~r~st for more than t"·l,nty years.
The abov~, from our vi~"lJL)int at least, constitutes all, ~Uld the only material and essential allegations of defendant· s counterclaim t ha.t in any way
forms the ground- "~ork or founda.tion for the Findi.ngs, Conclusions andd Decree complained of.
Subdivision :~ of the prayer of said counterclaim is as follows :
'• That said road hereinbefore described
be declared by this Court to be a public highway. and that the right of the defendant to
the use of said highway for all purposes; including the driving of livestock over the same
be quieted and confirmed. ''
Defendant. in support of the foregoing allegati~ns of his counterclaim, sought to establish by
proof that there had been a Public Highway for
sixty years or more extend·ing up and dou;n White
Pine Canyon. The proof shows White Pine Canyon
to be situate about three miles from Park City, extending in the northeasterly and southwesterly directions. and of a width varying from one-fourth of
a mile to ~ mile and a half. WhiJe the proof of respondent and counterclaimant showed that there had
been a means of travel. such as roadways for logging, paths for moving livestock, and for pedestrians
up and down the canyon since the early settlement
of Park City; it likewise showed that such roadways
and paths had changed locations from time. to time
to meet changing conditions and requirements.
There ''?as no proof that the particular Public
H-iah1rOJJ, rlescribed in the Findings and Decree
complained of and hereinafter referred to, was ever
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12:
us,ed by the public, or in fact ever existed. The
proof shows conclusiV1eJy and without contradiction
that in recent years there was laid out by plaintiffs
and their predecessors a private roadway, which
was used by others only by means of gates and only
by plaintiffs' express permission.
Aftert the testimony for both sides· ·had been
concluded, the derendant brought to ·the witness
stand one· R·. G. Heath, an engineer whom the def.endant during the cours.e of the' trial had induced
to make measurements of tlie ID'e:tes, bounds, variations, courses, diV1e,rgenee1s. ·and distances: of plaintiffs' private roadway, and plat the same, from the
point ·where it ente,rs their, gate at the northeast
corner of their land-Lot 8-·until it passes thru
the gate on the south side of their land, and thereupon asked and obtaJined leave to off,e:r as su1·reb·uttal the' testimony of the witness H,e,ath, in
which he described by met'e's, bounds, variations~
courses, divergences and distances, pla,intiffs' said
private roadway from the entrance of their property up to and beyond their housP. and offered in
evidence the plat (Defendant's Exhibit 1) of such
privatr roadway so pre~pared by the witness during
the period of the trial, which oral evidence and -plat
were admitted over pla[n'tiffs' objection and exception.
(
··
This evidence,· was offered on the seventh -last
day of the trial- and the objections and exception8
referred to appe1ar on pa~e 551 of the reporter's
transcript, ahd on page 649 of this record ·a.s num.bered and certified by the1 Clerk of the Court, as
follows :
'' MR. SULLIVAN :e If the· Court please,
I· obje-ct to that~ first upon the ground that the
map~ upon it's face to· everyone familiar with
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this coutroversYw i~ ~t:·lt'-t.•Xl)la.Hatorv.
SPcond.
w
if that map i~ iutt\nded to ~lunY w"ltut I appr('hend, and v;hat coun~t.\1 ~tatoo yp~~terday, to
~ho'Y a surYt:\y of the r•Jad\\~ay. then ''"t.\ objt.\ct ~
Yarious other grounds. One is, that the line
of this rond is not st•t out (Uld contained in the
complaint in tl1is c.ase. aB it should have been,
and thoe complaint in this c.ase was demurred to
as I remember. \l' e object to it no'v as incompetent, irrelevant. immaterial, and not proper
rebuttal, and in addition that there is not sufficient allegation in the complaint to admit the
proof that is now offered.
~

THE COI'.RT: You mean the counterclaim!
MR. ST:LLI\~. .-L,: Yes, counterclaim.
THE COl~T: Objection overruled.
MR. Sl"LLI\. ..A....\: Exception.''
Thereafter the trial Court made Findings~ Conclusions and Decree that this particular roadwayplaintiffs' private roadway -from the gate at the
east boundary of plaintiffs' land, near the northeast
corner thereof, was a public highway and decreed it
as such, by metes, bounds, variations, courses, divergences and distances.
A portion of paragraph 9 of said findings is as
follows :

9. That said road,vay leads from that public highway commonly known as the Park City
highway~ and passes over and along what is
known as Trottman 's Lane, and thence on to
the lnnds of the )Waintiffs, and the center lin~
of said ro~dway. as it passes over the lands of
tl1e plaintiffR, is described as follows:
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Commencing at a point North 1320 foot and
W eet 4472 feet from the quar~er corner, east
side, Se-ction 1, Township 2 South, Range 3
East, Salt ·Lake Meridian, .and running thence
South 31 deg. 40 min. West 248 reet; thence
South 54 deg, 41 min. West 154.3 feet ; thence
South 1 de·g. 27 min. West 139.7 f-eet; thence
South 64 deg. 53 min. West 144.6 feet; thence
S.outh 48 deg. 3 min. W·est 298 feet; thence
South 63 deg. West 136.3 feet; thence South 54
deg. 21 min. West 194.5 fe,et; thence South 4:5
de g. 48 min. West 203.3 feet; thence South 52
deg. 22 mjn. West 414 ·feet; thence South 42
deg. 59 min, West 52.3. feet, to the gate.
And the Court finds that in the us•e of said
roadway the public generally and the defendant
and his predecessors in interest have used and
occupied SIJ/td roadu;ay to the extent of one a,nd
one-half rods on each side of said center line
above described making·said roadway three rods
'lvid(f, as the srMn e passes through the lands of
the· plai11tifJs, and the Court finds thal three
rods is the 'width of said roadway and that said
width· has· been and is: necessary' to. the,·enj-oyment of said r0adway· for the purposes· for
which it has been used and is now beirlg used
by the p1.tblic generally, and by the defendant
and his predecessors in int~e~rest. The Court
finds that said rondwny ( refeerri1tJJ to thA o'f!.e
above described} has been t~ed by the pubhc
generally, openl'N, notoriously, contiHuously end
uninterruptedly, adversely and under claim o.f
right· for rnore than fifty years last past. and
that the defendant and his predecessors in interest hn1'e relied, and do rely upon said road~vay as a public highway." (Italics ours).
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The Court then

t~ntt..\r~ it~

dt\t•n\t\ in part n~ t'ol-

lo,vs :

·' 1·r IB

FlTR~rHER

ORDERED, AD-

JuDGED AND DECHEED tha.t tlH~re is a
road,Yay _,rhich is a publio high\\·ay, leading
f1·om the high,ray referred to as the Park City
His~~-;sy~ beginning at a point where a lane
-known as Trottman 's Lane, intercepts said
Park City H!.ghway, and running thence over
and along said 'rrottman 's Lane southerly towards White Pine Canyon~ until said roadway
l"€'aehes the north boundary of plaintiffs' said
land, and thence over and across Lot 8, above
described. belonging to the plaintiffs, from the
north boundary to the south boundary thereof;
and said roadway~ as the same passes over
plaintiffs ' said land is three rods wide; that is
to say, one and one-half rods on each side of
the oenter line thereof, which said center line
is described as follows. to-wit:

Commencing at a point North 1320 feet and
W e~t 441;§ feet from the quarter corner, east
side, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence
South 31 deg. 40 min. West 248 feet; thence
South 54 deg, 41 min. West 154.3 feet ; thence
South 1 deg. 27 min. West 139.7 feet; thence
South 64 deg. 53 min. West 144.6 feet; thence
South 48 deg. 3 min. West 298 feet; thence
South 63 deg. West 136.3 feet; thence South 54
deg. 21 min. \Vest 194.5 feet; thence South 45
de g. 4R min. West 203.3 fee~; thenoo South ~2
deg. 22 min. West 414 feet; thence South 42
deg. 59 min, West 52.3 feet, to the gate.

''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant,
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his ag_ents, repres.entativei and employees and
successors in interest, have the right to use said
roadw~y hereinbefone described for the driving
of sheep, cattle and other livestock, and for all
kinds of traffic, in the use, occupancy and enjoyment of said lands belonging to the defendant, and (or) his successors in interest.

"IT .IS FURTHER ORD·ERED, ADJlJDGED AND DECR.EED that the plaintice,
and each and all of th{ll.r agents, representatives, emp,loyoo's· and (or) successors in interest
are perpetualy enjoined a.nd restrained from in
any manner obstructing or interfering Wiith the
use, occupancy and enjoyment of said roadway
by the defendant, his succe'Ssors in inte·rest and
their a.gents, representatives and employees,
and by the pubUc generally, as the same passes
over and a.cross the plaintiffs' said lands hereinbefore described.''
Paragraphs o and 7 of appellants' Assignments
of Error are a.s follows:
(6) The Court abused its discretion and
erred in permitting the defendant at the close
of the trial and overr plain tiffs ' objections a.nd
exc.eptions, to prove by its. engineer Heath, under the guiser of 'sur-rebuttal;' ~the me·tes,
bounds, variations, courses and distances of the
roadway described in defendant's .Amtended
Counterclaim and in the Findings and Decree
herein, but not set out in the original eountercl~a
·
(7) The Court erred in permitting proof
by counterclaimant of the survey by his engineer Heath, made during the trial, over plaintiffs' objections and exceptions~ and in making
its Findings, Judgment and Decree as to the
metes, ~ounds, variations, courses and dis-
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tances of the rond,v·ay us SE:'t forth: in the judgment and decree, bt~eau~t.~ same was not involvcJ
in the i~~ue~ n~ frnml~l in this l'Hsl\, and w ns
not iuvcJlYed in the triall)f the ea~l\ until all thP
evidenctlo of :both partit.~s was fully l'.nnlpltl\tl\d. ''
Paragraph~ 1 to ~~ iuclu~iYl\ of ~\ppt\llanb;' Assignments of Error, art:_)! a challenge of the sufficiency of the eYidence to justify the judgment and
decree herein.
Appellants rely mainly upon two propositions:

1. The alleged Public Highway sought to be
described in defendant· 5 counterclaim was not deF-cribed "ith sufficient certainty to justify the trial
Court in admitting the evidence of the engineer
Heath, or oi admitting in evidence the plat prepared
by the engineer Heath- Defendant's Exhibit 1 nor was the alleg-ed Public Highway described in
in defendant's counterclaim with sufficient particularity to justify th~ Findings, Conclusions and Decree complained of.
( 2) Thern was no evidence that the particular
roadway described in the Findings of Fact and Decree was ever u9ed by the public or the defendant,
~ave and except by means of gates, and save and
Except for but two or three years p:cior to this suit,
and save and except by plaintiffs' or their predecessors' express permission, thru and by means of
gates.
:i
At the time of preparing Assignments of Error
herein, plaintiffs' counsel had the impression that
counterclaimant and respondent had obtained leave
of Court and filed an amended counterclaim setting
forth with exactness the metes, bounds, variations,
cour~es, divergences and distances of the roadway
claimed~ but now, upon an examiaation of the record, 've find that no such amended pleading was
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filed by respondent, although _the record shows that
the Court was quite willing, and even suggested that
such amendment be filed; \Yhich accounts for some
reference in our .A. ssignments to the error of the
Court in allowing such a.mend1nent.
"'Te will discuss the two propositions abov:e set
out, in their order.
'],here was no sufficient allegations in defend·
ant's counterclaim upon which the Findings and
DecDee here can be permitted to stand. 'J1he counterclaim wholly fails to sufficiently, and as required
by law, de£cribe by me~tes, bounds, va.riations,
cours,es, divergences and distances, the alleged pub·
lic highway.
In Volume 19, C. J., under '' Eas.ements, '' and
at page 1001, Sec. 267, the law is announced as
follows:
,,. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF
OF EASEMENT.- The complaint must describe thet easement .so as to sho\v the nature,
extent, and location of the right cla,lmed, in order that a definite decree n1ay be· Pnt~ered. ''
There are many cas,es cited in Corpus Juris in
support of the foregoing text, among which is the
case of T.everone v. 'Veakley\ (Ual.), 101 P. 304.
Subdivision :3 of the of the! syllabus is as follows:
'' EJ\REMENTS (SPc. 61 ~)-ACTION rro
}jST.l\.RTJTRfi - NECESSI'rY OF EXA.C'T
DESCRIPTION IN PLEADING·.
Where it is soug·ht to have it decreed that a
person's realty is subje-ct to a use or eas,e·ment.
in favor of another, it must be described in the
pLeadings \vith such certainty as to enable defendant to de-finitely kno'\\r exactly "rhat portion
is so claimed.
{Ed. Note.- For other cases S(l!€' Ease-
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ntent~,

Cent. Dig., ~t.·l~. 141; .J)oc. Dig. Seo
61 ~ ). "
The Supreme Court of C'nlifornia, in cliseussing
the sufficiency of pleading-s in a suit to esta.blish a
public high"-ay, uses this language :
· ~ Plaintiff soug-ht by this action not only
the abatement of a particular alleg·ed obs truction erected by defendant's testator and compensation for injury caused thereby, but also
a tlecree L'sta.blishing bet,VIOOn the parties the
fact that certain of defendant's property, consisting of a strip of land three-eighths of a mile
long, was subject to plaintiff's use as a public
highway or as a private right of way, and en~
joining defendant from maintaining any obstruction on any part thereof. The decree
grants this relief as to the whole strip of land.
It goes without saying that where it is sought to
have it decreed that real property of a person
is subject to a use or easement.in favor of another, the property affected must be desc-ribed
in the pleadings mth such certainty as to enabe th~ party against whom the claim is made
to definitely know exactly what portion of his
property is so claimed, and the judgment establishing the validity of the claim must. be definite and certain as to the property affected." •
(Italics ours) .
In the instant case the Findings and Decree are
definite and certain, and the testimony of flf.. ath,
and plat prepal'led by him and admitted over our
objection, is definite and certain, but the pleadings
which are a necessary and indispensable foundation ·
for the evidence and decree, are fatally defective.
\\' e submit that a case cannot be found in the
books where a definite, specific decree such as here,
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has been p~.rmitted, by an appellate Court, to stand,
where there is no attempt in the pleadings to define
or describe the highway, roadway or easernJent,
sought to be judicially subjected to public or private us'e'.
A portion of the syllabus in the case of Fox v.
Pierce (Mich.), 15 N.
p. 880, is as follows:

w.;

''A bill to establish a right of way, and to
enjoin encroachme,nts upon it, cannot be sustained where it does not furnish the moons for
declaring exactly what the right is, and the
shape, dimensions, and precise locality which
it occupies, and the proofs show nothing but an
oral agreem,ent for its establishment, and such
occasional variations in the bounds of the locality as to make it impossible ~o determine
where it originally existed.''
The Michigan case above cited, involved a passageway in the city of Detroit. In that case the
plaintiff made a map showing the· exact location and
its connection to and with other prop'e,rty and attached to it and made a part of its complaint, but
the Court held that such method failed to conform
to that exactness required in the pleading that is
obtained only by a survey, an exact "tie-in" of the
. J1roposed easem1ent er drive\vay with definite, fixed
points covered by thrl general city survey.
It ought not require text-books or Court opinions to satisfy the judicial m.ind that any complaint
(in the instant ca.se a counterclailn), upon which it
is soug-ht to establish a judg1nent or decree of Court,
must coVie-r the subject-matter so to be adjudicated
\vi th as much~ or more, spe·cific exactness as the
judgment or decre·e sought. To illustrate : Could
it, or "rould it be contended for a moment that a
party, se1eking to quiet title to a five-acre tract of
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hu1d, could llt~8cribe hi8 land in his plt~adiug by ~ny
i11y th~H i1. \Ya8 in l...tll ~' 8t\etit)Jl 1, rfO\\'ll::-\hip :J
~uurh. l~angt\ 3 bH8t. in \\"hitp Pine CnnytHl, thrt"P
miles llln·tlnYt\8t ot Park City. and upon such conlplaint ba8t\ a d~.ree 8t.\tt iug: forth au t\xaet, correct,
detailed description of hi::; TIYt\-aer~ tract 1 The
ans"\\-.er 1nnst be negntiYP.
Xo\\-, can a plaintiff ~in the instant case counterclaimant). because such tract is long and narrow
as a public highway~ l)btain a judgm€'Ilt and decree
by any le~s definite, detailed description in his
_pleading than would be required if he sought to
quiet · title to a rectangular tract embracing fiV'e
acre~·! Certainly not.
PlP-adings have a definite, fixed place; are intended to meet a definite f!equirement in juclicial
procedure... Especially is tlus true in the American
Sta::e~. as well as under the English Conunon Law.
Xot only was the counterclaim fatally defective
in failing to set out by metes, bounds, variations, divergences, course~ and distances, but all the evidence of oounterclaimant, except that of the engineer Heath, which was admitted over plaintiffs'
objections and exceptions, was ·equally defective in
failing to c.onform to the metes. bounds, variations,
di\e!'gences. cours~s and distances contained in the
Fincl~_ngs and Decree herein.
Further, the testimony of Heath, and defendant's Exhibit 1, each relate solely to a present way
or road- neither relate in any manner to the old
way attempt0Cl to be here claimed by the defendant;
neither is even an attempted description or survey
of thfll claimed ancient highway. Both relate to a
rf)adway~ the location, metes, bounds, coursies, divergences and distanees of which are conclusively
shown by the. evidence of all witnesses herein to be
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a changed roadway- not the original or claimed
way.

The law as announced in this State, and as recognized in all the States, is so definite· and ce1rta.in
on this essential requirement, in both the pleading~
and the proof,as not to admit of argument.
The evidence, until the sur-rebuttal of the engineer Heath~ was as indefinite and uncertain as
wel"le the pleadings. The evidence was in effect
along the same general line of the pleadings, namely,
that there~ had been a. road, roads~ cow-paths or
"rhat not, up vVhite· Pine Canyon for' many years.
'rime and printer's ink will not permit a reha~shing of the testimony of the witnesses in behalf
of the counte~rclaimant touching the genernlity of'
logging roadR, eo,v-paths, etc.., up this canyon for
fifty years.
rrhe te)stimony of the witness "Tilliam Archiba~ld, covering many page·s. is illustrative of the! lack
of that exactne·s:s requj.red by law to establish a public highway. His testimony deals with roads up
and down this canyon in the, early days, and years
before title by Government Patent pass.ed to tbe
plaintiffs or their predeeessors, and ye·ars before
title by Government Patent passed to the dPfendant
or his predecessor.
Tha~t thPre have been wagon road~ and cow
paths up and down this canyon at various points
from its e·arliest history, is not disputed; but co"r
paths or logQ"ing roads on the south side of the creek
or evP~n on thP north sirle of the creek, mrtnv rods
from thP. nlaintiffR' pre~Ren1- private road. 'vbiel1 ori2"inal logging roads and cow paths have long- sincP
been aba1ndoned and g·rown over with underbrush,
and 'vhich weDe Pstahlisbed lone- vearR beforP· patent
passed to plaintiffR or the~ir predecessors, can by no
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~tretoh of the inla.gitHt~tion nr by no st rt.\tc.h of the
law. furni~h any ft)Ulh.la.tion for dt.\olaring plaintiffs'

priYate road. as sur,-~\yt.\d and de~L~ribeti in tht.\ !4,i nding:~ and Deer~~. a Public Hig-h\\-ay.
Certain road~ up and dow··n th€'8t." canyons were
recognized by the GuY~rnment engineers at the
time the GoYernment surYey and the t}oy~rnment
plat '\Yere made, but not the rond\\-ay tl~sc.ribed in
the Decree complained of.

The Government fie-ld notes (Exhibit D) and
the Government rectograph copy of official plat of
Township 2 South, Range 3 East (Exhibit E), are
~xplained. if explanation was required, by the testimony of engineer E. H. Burdick, on pages 342-350.
and map prepared by him (Exhibit F). It will be
noted from these Government records that the
roads extending over Lot 8 - the land in controversy- at the time of the Government survey,
about 1902. were no where near the plaintiffs' present private roadway as specifically described by the
testimony of the -engineer Heath.
\\e submit there is absolutely no evidenoo to
show that the private roadway described by the
engineer Heath has boon in existence even as a private roadway, for a period of more than' five or six
years, and during such time has been used by the
connterclaimant and his predecessors, if at all, by
means of g-ates and by permission of the plaintiffs
and appellants.
The roads shown on the G<:>vernment rectograph
copy of plat, Exhibit E, and likewise shown by t:Re
Govflrnment fi~ld notPs. Eyhibit D, and illustrated
bv the t~timonv of Mr. Burdick and his plat, Exhibit F, show t~o main traveled, well defined roads,
which beyond all reasonable doubt wrere. the only

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

evidences of roads over Lot 8 at the time, of the Government survey. One, of these roads, designated on
Exhibit F as road ''A'' approaches Lot 8 fron1 the
north, at a point more than half the distance from
the east to the west line of Lot 8, .and passes thn1
Lot 8, oy,e,r the west line, and onto Lot 7. The other
road, designated as road '' D'' approaches J.;ot 8 on
the east boundary line thereof, and a short distanc-e
south of the northeast corner of Lot 8, and extends
south on the south side of the creek, and passes out
'Of Lot 8 and onto Lot 9 about two-fifthsi of the distance from the1 east to the west line· of Lot 8.
Road '' B '' is the· road that the ·witne·ss Street
described as passing between the home where· his
mother died, and the cre·ek, at the tim~e he, was a
small boy.
The evide,nce· furnished by the Government records and the testimony of the 'vitness Street, are
in no vvay contradicted by the· t,e,stimony of any witnesses in this case.
The witnesses on behalf of counterclaimant tell
of a road or roads ''up and down'' White. Pine Canyon. The Governm·ent plat and field notes show
two roads up and down White Pine Canyon, namely
Road "A." and Road "B", neitbJe,r of which are
identical with nor parallel to, nor at any point near
the road de-scribed by metes and bounds in the testimony of the witness Heath, or in the plat furnished by the witness Heath, nor can they be· construed to he, in any \vay identified, or even connected
with the easement or public highway described in
the de·cve~e· herein.
We might d·w. ell at le1ngth upon the· characterthe · indefinit~e,ness of the roadway up and down
White Pine Canyon as testified to by respondent's
'vitnesses, but th0! lack of sufficient definiteness in
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such tt'stitnony cnn bt' dt'tt'rlninl'\l by thi~ Court only
upon n cnrt~l'ul t'XHJllinatitnl nnd perusal of the abstract and c)riginal rt'\?.ord la\rt'in. but it i~ sufficient
to say that ~Yt\n though th~t~ pleading~ hat' have derc..Hhl"·ny with ~u t'fieil\ll t part ieularit y,
·w·hich they did lll)t. the tl'Stinlony of th~ '"itnes~es
fell far short of making ~Yt\n a p;·inHz. fac·ie case for
eounterclaimant and rt•spond~Ht.
seribed

~nell

In \~olume 9, R. C. L., p. 35, Sec. 35. the rule
is laid down that in order to obtain an easement by
prescription, the claimant n1ust us~ the right of way
continuously and without variation as to the line or
roadw-a~- of the easem~nt. The right cannot be acquired to p:1.ss over a tract of land generally. It
must he C•)nfined to a specific or definite line. Citing
many case~. among -which is the case of S. H. Oroshier v. John M. Brown, 25 L. R. A., N. S., p. 174.

In Schnler..barger v. A. H. Johnstone (Wash.),
116 Pac., 8-!3; 35 L. R. A., X. S., p. 41, the first part
of the syllabus is as follows :

., A private right of way cannot be secured
by a prescription over uninclosed land.''
Also see note at bottom of page 941.
The rule seems to be well fixed that the mere
permissive use by the owner to his neighbor to pass
over land and after the owner fenced, by making
gates for the convenience of the neighbor, no sufficient facts in such act is found to warrant the conclusion that the neighbor's use was hostile or adverse to the owner, and henc.e could not s-ett in motion the law of adverse possession or be invoked in
aid of the clai.J:n of having obtained a right by. prescription.
In gflnera1, a private ea~ement for a right of
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way cannot be acquiroed over uninclosed land unless
the use is such as to convey to the owner reasonable
notice that .a claim is made hostile to hin1.
'Vhere the O"\Vner of uninclosed ·hind~, over
which his neighbors had been in the habit of passing, left gates and bars in a f'e:nce which he erected,
that act, inste,ad of indicating a surrender or acquiesence in the right of persons to pass, e-vidences a
diffe-rent intention.
In case of Funk v. Anderson, 22. Utah, 238; 61
Pae., 1006, the rule s.eems to require tweuty years
to obtain a right by pre,scription, aild the
same rule pr,ervails in case of Rio Grande
f stern
Railroad v. Salt Lake InVJestment Comp.any, 35
Utah, 528; 101 Pac., 586.

'V

''A prescript~ve~ right to an ·easement can
only ariSie after use and enjoyment for a period
of twenty years.'' (From syllabus).
·
Funk v. Anderson, supra.
Adverse poss.ession can be, acquired in no
other manner than that pr e!Scribed by c·omp.
Laws 1907, Sec. 2866, so the title to land cannot
be acquired by prescription as at common law.''
(From syllabus).
1

Rio Grande Western Ra,ilroad v. Salt Ijake
Investment Co., supra.
"An ease·ment in land may he acquir1ed by
a continuous use for 20 ye,ars. '' (From syllabus).
Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Salt Lake
Inv-e·stment Co., supra.
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In case of Jones ,.. \' HJl Boohove (Mas~.), 61
X. \\' ., 3±:2. it i:S -held. that \Yht\n.' tllPrP \VHS an PXpres~ graut by au. iiH.tiYidual to a railn>ad for a
right or \Yay. the l'onrts 'vill presumte tho abaudnnment of the rig·ht ()f ,,-ny "-hpn the railroad. con1pnHy tu•)k up ir~ track, it~ tit~.::., and rt\UlOYed the
bridge thnt "~as e~sential to the operation of its
railroad OYer this easement. X o definite length of
time "-as required to create an abandonment.
In ,-olume ti. :@ed. Statutes Ann., p. 498, Sec.
~-!:--;-. under subdivision 18, entitled ''RIGHT OF
\CA.Y O,. . ER PUBLIC L.-\_...~DS," a very brief enactment made July ~G. lStiG. seeks to give a right
o.t ·way for construction of highways over public
lands. The foot-notes to this section a.re very elaborate, and it seems that the Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of \\ allowa County v. Wade, 43
Ore., 253. attempt to construe what the rr. S. Congress meant by the above section.
Th~re

seem to be a great many citations . on
page 499 of said \"rol. 6, Fed. Statutes, where various
northwestern States have sought to get some meaning to the section above referred to.
" Under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 1115, providing that a highway shaU be doomed ·to have
been · dedicated ·to the use of the public when
continuously ~used as a public• thoroughfare' .for
ten years, use· imder private right ·is insufficient to show. dedieation, and such use, however
long, does not make the way public, and the
mere fact . that, the public also use it without
objection from the owner ·will not make the way
public.'' (From syllabus).
Morris v. Blunt; et- al., 49 Utah, 243;
161 Pac~, 1127.
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''A prescriptive easement does not arise
in seven years by ana,logy to the statute barring
action to recover realty when _a plaintiff was
not s1eized of the property within Heven years,
such statutes not applying to rights of way or
easements, but prescriptive right can arise only
by adverse use and enjoyment under claim of
right uninterrupted and continuous for 20
years.'' (From syllabus).
Morris v. Blunt, supra.
'' Evidence held insuffici·ent to show acquisition of highway easement by prescription;
the use having been interrupted at various
tin1es during the alleged prescriptive period."
(From syllabus.).
Morris v. Blunt, supra.

''A cla,im to a right of way by pr.escription
cannot be supported "rhere the way has been
allowed as a. matter of accommodation, and
claimant's use of it has not been such as to
give the landowner notice of an adVIerse user.''
(From syllabus).
Lapique v. Morrison (Cal.) 154 P., 881.
''"There defendant and his te-nants had
been in the hal;lit of pHssing over an uninclosed
strip of plaintiff's land for eight years, but had
never claim101d that they had the right to use
the land to plaintiff or his grantor, a finding
that defendant had not a prescriptive right to
the use of a way over the land should not bP
disturbed." (From syllabus).
Clarke v. C'la.rke (Cal.) 66( P.a.c., 10.
'' The alle:ga,tions of a complaint in a snit
to enjoin interfteTence with the use of land did
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not ~htn\· a right bnsed on dedication, where it
allegt\d merely that for 30 YL\ars plaintiffs, thl\ir
predtlel'~~sl'r~, and the public had L)}->l\nly u~t.\d
the land as a high\\·ay. '' (},rt.)lll syllabu~).

}_,ai"r et al. Y. 'Yht)ehYright Const. Co.,
-!~} l~ tah, 214; 163 l)ac., ~5ti.
· · The oomplnint in an action to enjoin interference "ith the u~e of land as a highway
did not show a right based on adverse user,
where it did not allege thaf the use of the land
"~as adverse and under a claim of right.''
(From syllabus).
Farr etal '· Wheelwright Const., Co.,
. supra.
Easement by prescription must be acquired by
twenty years' user after patent issues, as no
prescriptive rights can be acquired against the
Lnited States.
Lund

Y. \\... ilcox,

34 lTtah, 205; 97 P., 33.

A prescriptive easement arises .only by an adverse use and enjoyment thereuf, continuous
and and uninterrupted for twenty years under
a claim of right.
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 227;
26 P., 291.
Yeager v. ,V.oodruff, 17 Utah, 361; 53
P., 1045.
Coleman v. Hines, 24 Utah, 360; 67 P.,
1122.
'~

In order to acquire a private easement
in the nature of a right of way over t.he lands
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of another, the claimant 1nust have used the
same openly, continuously, and adversely for
20 Yle1ars, during all of whith time the title to
the land over 'vhich the easement is clai1ned
must have beem out of the U nit<td States."
(From syllabus).
Bolton v. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591;
127 P., 335.
4

The use, for mor1e than 1.,00 years, of a
well-known and well-defined roadway from a
public road to a great pond, by hunters~ .fishermen, picnic partie·s, oolehrators on public occasions, and by whomsoever chose, 'vi thout objection and without obstruction, doe'S not establish a way by pre'Rcription or dedication, wher€·
it does not appear that such use was not ''~th
the express or implied permission of the owners
of the land.
Acceptance hy public authoritieB is ne·cessary to create a public way by dedication."
(From syllabus).
'

Slater v. Gunn (Mass.) 41 L. R . A., 268.
'' Mere user of a right of way over another's land, who had kno,vl1edge· the-reof for
a period of 33 ye·ars,' but without claim of right
or title, is insufficient to establis b a right of
way by prescription, under Code, Sec. 3004,
providing that the use of an easement is not
evidence of a claim of right, but the fact of adverse possession must be established by evidence independent of use, etc.'' (From syllabus).
McBride v. Bair (Iowa.) 112 N."T., 168.
''A vested right to a right of 'va~r may be
acquired by use· for a sufficient length of time.
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It mu~t be occupit\d nnd u~t.\tl n.s n right, und not
1uerely a~ a iaYor er l•riYilegP g-ranted by tho
tl\Yuer of the s~rvient lands.''
Johnson v. Lt\\\·i~, 14 8. \\"., 4li6;
47 ..-\.rk., 66.

''An easement l)~~ p~seription cannot aris~
out of an ~O'Te{\ment. license ·or n1e-rt.\ neighborly accommodation, but must be acqui~ed
adversely.'' (From syllabus).
Pinheiro '· Bettencourt (Cal)
118 P .. 941.
·~"Where defendant. before acquiring a. right
of way over plaintiff\~ land, by prescription,
mad~ a material deviation from the previously
traveled way to avoid a washout in the old way,
such denation broke the continuity of th~ use
required by law to establish the prescriptiv~e
right." (From syllabus).
Lund v. Wilcox, 64 l,..tah, 205; 97 Pac., 33.
Justice Frick. speaking for this Court in Lund
v. Wilcox, supra. \ery aptly, clearly and concisely
stated the rnle that has come down to us from the
statutes and adjudicated cases in the various States
for the last half century, in the following language:
" There is another reason why respondent
cannot be decreed a right of way over appellant's land. As we have pointed out, the roadway was changed in 1900. This change broke
the continuity of the use by respondent. Jones,
in his excelle;nt work on Eas~ments, in section
295, states- the law upon this point as follows:
'Aprescriptiv~ right of way cannot be acquired
by tacking together two distinct p~riods of use
(lf two separate ways, thoue-h · one ·"\Vas abandoned for the other with ·the consent of the
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landowner, and the two pe1riods together would
amount to the prescriptive time requisite to
give a pliescriptive right of way. It is essential
that the use should relate s.tricty to the id6utical way over which the right is claimed. A way
imports a right of passing in a particular lin<t,
and not eve1rywhere, OVie'r the land upon which
the right may be claimed.' This does not mean
that .a person using the right of way may not
deviate .at all from the traveled rut or track,
to the e.xtent, at least, that this may become
necessary in a I"e,asonable use of the right of
V.'"ay; but it does mean that the claimant may
not abandon on€1 track or right of way and adopt
another. In I( urtz v. Hoke, 172 P.a., 165; 38
Atl., 549~· it is held that a variation of 20 feet
from the trave1led road is fatal to continuity of
us,e.. It is generally held by the Courts that a
deviation such as occurred in the case at bar
destroys the continuity of use required by law.
'f'he rule is illustrated and applied in the follo~Ting cases: o,vens Y. Crossett~ 105 Ill., 354;
Rrvan v. EaRt Rt. Ijonis. 12 Ill. App., :390;
P1eters v. Little, 95 G-a., 151, 22 S. E., 44; ~~ol
lendore v. Thomas, 93 Ga., 300, 20 8. E., 329. ''

''A use under a. mere licens'e' 'vill. not ripen
int·• an easement by
syllabus).

pre~~eription. ''

rr

(From

. -~

Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. 1-Ia.skett (I{an)
67 P., 446.
See: Ma.ra.zzani v. 1Jnited State~s Fuel
Co., 65 Utah, 1231 234 Pac., 531.
Barboglio v. ·Gibson, 61 Utah, 314; 213
Pac., 385.
Sche,ttler et al. v. Ijynch. 23 Utah, 305;
64 P., 955.
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Deig et al., 4~~ Ind., 4:>;,, tla~
1~iu1., p. t)~>U, ns t ollow:;:
· · It i~ oonet~lt'i on all huuds t lut t t ht.' lt\gi~lature has no po'ver. in nuy ease, to take thP
property of one ind.ividual and p~•~s it ovt\r to
anolher \\ithout rt\fert\llt~ h) ~onlt.\ usP to '" hieh
it is to be applied for the public benefit. • • • It
seems not to be allo"·abl~. therefore, to authorize private roads to be laid out across th~ lands
of un"illing parties by au .ex~reise of this right.
The easement in sueh.. a case ""ould be the- property of him for whom it ''as established.''
··.A roadway used by the public over government land does not become a public highway
for mere user for 20 years. or by prescription,
under Rev. St. Sec. 2477 (L. S. Comp. St. 1~•01,
p. 1367). granting a right of way for construction of highways over public lands not reserveq
for public uses .. ,

In

ea~t.\

of 'Yild

Y.

Court quoh:\s L\H.lley (\nlst.

Pross '· State, 41 So .. 875; 147 Ala., 125;

10 Am. Dig., p. 63, Sec. 4.

''A road leading from a river to a highway
was used by those owning adjoining lands to
haul wood and stone, but this limited use was
not under claim of right, and the road did not
lead to anywhere in particular; there being no
bridge at the place where it approached the
river. The road was never used by the public
to any extent. and a part of it was always
roug-h and unsafe for general use. H~ld: insufficient to establish a highway by prescription."
Fairchild v. Stewart, 89 N. W., 1075; 117
Iowa. 734; 10 Am. Dig., p. 64.
Proof of public tr~vel over wild and unoccupied land on different tracks, as suited the conven-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

ience of travelers, whose cours:e was shaped with
r,eiference to high and low wate·r, the land bordering
on a river, is insufficient to establish a highway by
user.
Lyle v. Lesia, 31 N. W., 23; 64
10 Am. Dig., p. 64.

~1ieh.,

16;

" We do not think the testimony as t\) the
land used for travel up to the time of Pettibone's survey is definite enough to establish a
highway by user. The· land was wild, unoccupied, and uncultivated. The testin1ony shows
there wer,e several tracks, and people· traveled
all over the bottom, as suited their convenience;
shaping the,ir course also in reference to high
and low water times.''
Ijyle v. I__Jesia, supra.
~ee

case San I3ernardino National Bank, Pt al.
v. tT ones, et al. (CaL) 271 Pac., 1103, to the effect
that a purchaser who obtains title to patented property is required only to examine the titl,e record
and to make such observations on the land for easeInents or other claims as the ordinary prudent person would make,· and when he has done this, his title
cannot be impeached for some road,vay, e~asement,
or other claim,ed right not disclosed by the record
and not clearly a,nd plainly open to viP"\V upon inspection.
The trial Court apparently overlooked the rule
of law so clearly and fully outlined and de·fined by
this Court in the case of Morris v. Blunt, SU1J'l'a,
when it made its Findings and De-cre8! herein, as
well as ¥then it made the so-called enlarged and
ext~nded restraining order he:rein during the course
of the trial n,nd on the 14th day of September, 1928,
(Anst. 32-33).
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This ~o-ealled enlarg-ed und t-xtended restraining orde-r, "··hich appl\ars on pages 4-l nnd -t.;> of the
transcript t~-\..h~t. 32-33). "·as by its language and
verbiage so s"-t~eping, as "·e con~t rut.~ it, as to prevent appellants, o\vuers of the rt\al property, from
interfering with respondent in the driving and graz.
ing of his shet•p and other li,·t)stoek upoti the \\..hole
of said Lot S: for said ''lllte Pine Canyon Road had
not at that time been in any "·ay, shape or form
identified by m~tt,:ls, bounds, variations, courses, divergences and dista11res. and in fact the said socalled ·. White Pine Canyon Road,'' as it crossed
Lot S, ns shown by the old trails, consisted of many
roads and trails in many directions, and by said
~o-called extended 3Jld enlarged restraining order
there ''as no width fixed or prescribed of said road,
-no metes. bounds~ variations or divergences provided for in said order, and said order amounted
in legal effect to a restraining upon plaintiffs from
interfering with the defendam.t in trespassing his
sheep and other livestock, without limit of time,
upon plaintiffs' garden, poluting and destroying
plaintiffs' culinary water, tramping and eating their
meadow lands, the garden, and entering the very
door-yard.

In fact, if under such restraining order
fendant's sheep and other livestock entered
hom~, the milk-house or other out-buildings of
plaintiffs, they would have been violating
Court's order to have interferred.

dethe
the
the

We mention the foregoing to illustrate 'vhat to
our mind was a complete lack of legal kno,vledge on
the part of the trial Court and respondent's counsel
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touching the rights of a land-owner- home-owner
-to protect such land and home against trespass~ers
under the so-cal1ed guise that such trespasser was
trailing his live1stock over a so-called vVhite Pine
Canyon Road.
Up to the time of issuing such restraining order
it had uot occurred to respondent's counsel the necessity of describing the· proposed road claimed to
be a Public Highway, with any n1ore particularity
than ''the \Vhi te Pine CH111yon Road ove:r Lot 8. ''
The language. of the order re.fe·rred to and
complained of at the time same was entered was
just as indefinite and uncertain as defendant's
pleadings, and as defendant's evidence up to the
time that the witness He!ath \Vas called to the stand.
If the defendant's idea of the1 location of the
so-called ''White, Pine Canyon Road'' took it thru
plaintiffs' garden, thru their n1eadow lands, past
their front door, or into their house, and defendant
sought to drive his sheerp thereon, plaintiffs would
be in danger of violating such order by resisting.
The right of a home-owner to proteet his hon1e
against tre·spass and de·struction was, \V~ ahYays
thought, not only a sacred right but a natural duty.
\\r e also caJl the attention of this Court to th~
fact that althoug·h this restraining ordeT \Vas sought
to be va:cated by motions. and reque1sts on the part
of these appellants in the' lower Court, such restraining: order still stands, unlP1ss it he deemed that the
san1P \n1,s superceded by the final decree in this case.

Th0 restrnining· .order referred to is mentioned
here only to illustrate the apparent lack of appreciation and apparent lack of kno\vledge of the· ]a\\~
of Public Higlnvays and Easen1e-nts in this Stat~ by
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~Ollle t)f t ht:\ part it"~

l'OllC.el"Ut\d

111 t ht\

t riaJ

0

thi~

t'

ease.
~··i ::"~
In e~.Hll'lu~itHl pern1it u~ to ~ay thn.t thPrP· i~ no
sufficit'nt ple-ading~ and no sufficient evidence upon
""'hich the final decrt.'~ in thi~ cnsp can staJH.i, Rllld 'v\.~
respectfully submit that the same should oo reversed.
1

ED'\,.IX D. HATCH,
G. M. SlTl.LIVAN,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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